








Postcolonial theological themes and methodologies are particularly useful for considering issues of indeterminate sex and gender, since they appeal to theological goods which are willing to sit with uncertainty. Drawing on comparisons between Caster Semenya and Saarti/Saartjie/Sara/Sarah Baartman, the “Hottentot Venus”, I show that atypical non-Western bodies are still made subject to discourses of Western classification, and that historical figurings of female bodies as there to be colonized, conquered and tamed chime with theological colonizations of all indeterminately sexed and gendered bodies. Postcolonial theologies might help to disrupt naive certainties surrounding bodies and their sexes, thereby pointing to a theology of hybridity which is less clear and exclusive. Importantly, this also disrupts Western and non-Western sex-gender imperialisms. Discourses of empire are not only those which have arisen in Western contexts, but also those which formulate and disseminate speech of another empire, that of narrow conformity to particular sexed norms. It is appropriate for theologians working in the former metropoles to speak into and critique some non-Western discourses, not untouched by our own colonial past and present, but also not immobilized by it. To reject colonial frameworks of power does not mean to idealize or render immaculate those in non-Western contexts with whom we seek to engage.


	In 1810, Sara/Saartjie Baartman, a young Khoisan woman from South Africa, travelled to Europe with a Dutchman, Hendrick Cezar, whose brother Pieter Willem Cezar owned the plantation on which Sara/Saartjie had grown up as a slave. First in England and later in France, where she died in 1815, Sara/Saartjie appeared in exhibitions as the “Hottentot Venus”. Khoisan women (“Hottentot” is an archaic term for the socio-ethnic group now known as Khoisan) were figures of fascination for European scientists and naturalists because of their large, prominent buttocks, and what were often figured as unusual genitalia, with long labia minora hanging down several inches below the vulva. These were taken as evidence of the differences in “natural” anatomy of black and white women (though it is probable that, at least in some cases, the elongated labia of Khoisan women represented a practice of deliberate stretching, rather than an inborn genetic characteristic – see Lyons and Lyons 2004: 32-33). Sara/Saartjie was variously called brusque and brutal, reminiscent of a monkey or orang-utan, and described as having buttocks so large they were deformed (see descriptions cited in Sharpley-Whiting 1999: 23-24), and Europeans’ fascination with what they believed they knew of her body has often been considered evidence of exoticizing and colonizing attitudes toward African female bodies, necessarily sexualized and primitivized in a particular way (bearing in mind that she never allowed her genitals to be publicly viewed in her lifetime – though her genitals, excised from her body, were exhibited after her death – Crais and Scully 2009: 140). Clifton C. Crais and Pamela Scully suggest,

“Sara Baartman disappeared from history as the identity she had performed on-stage and in Europe’s halls was entombed in science and figured ever more prominently in the Western imagining of women, race, and sexuality: the primitive woman with extraordinarily large buttocks and, so many were told, remarkable sexual organs.” (Crais and Scully 2009: 2) 

	Almost two hundred years later, what looked like strikingly similar narratives seemed to be coming into play. In 2009, the runner, Caster Semenya (also young and also South African), hit news headlines when it was revealed that she was undergoing “gender tests”​[2]​ following the World Athletics Championships in Berlin, when she won the 800m race well ahead of the rest of the field, and eight seconds faster than her own previous personal best. Other athletes in the women’s races had, it was said, suggested that Semenya was not really a woman and therefore should not be allowed to compete against them. The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), which separates athletic competitors into males and females, finds it difficult to be quite sure what to do with bodies which push the demarcations – though, contrary to what the brouhaha surrounding Semenya might have suggested, such cases are not unprecedented.​[3]​ Semenya was subsequently cleared to race against women, but the ongoing speculation surrounding her likely genital appearance and/or genital-chromosomal configuration repeats many of the same tropes familiar from narratives about Sara/Saartjie Baartman. Carina Ray remarks,

“For those who dismiss the idea that Baartman and Semenya can be viewed within the same analytic lens I would simply say that their obvious differences as historical subjects do not negate the shared ways in which their Black bodies have become public spectacles and (mis)treated as anatomic curiosities that deserve neither respect nor dignity. It is precisely the fact that nearly two hundred years separate them and that Semenya is in so many ways categorically different than Baartman that underscores the powerfully consistent way in which the Black body has been dehumanized and viewed with a dangerous mix of fear and fascination across time and space.” (Ray 2009: 19)

	Interestingly, there was a sense in much of the news coverage of the more recent case that it was not surprising Semenya should have “slipped through the net”, given that she had grown up in a small rural village in South Africa. This conveniently colonial attitude implied that of course Semenya and her family would not have realized there was anything unusual about her, since they were poor and uneducated and could not be expected to know any better. What was less often mentioned was the fact that Semenya was, and remains at the time of writing, an undergraduate at the University of Pretoria, where she studies Sport Science in the Department of Biokinetics, Sport and Leisure Sciences. She is resident at the University’s High Performance Centre, whose facilities attract top athletes from across the world (Ginnane 2011). As such, she is in an environment where hi-tech sports medicine and sports physiology are de rigueur, surrounded by professionals who would have been well aware that her body was unusually tall and strong for a young female athlete even before she competed in Berlin. 
The language and tropes embedded in the media coverage of the Semenya case are not insignificant, since they make clear that Semenya and those associated with her within South Africa are being contrasted with “enlightened” Western urbanites who could never have made such a crass error as to “miss” diagnosing someone with an unusual bodily sex (or, rather, what has been assumed by commentators to be an unusual bodily sex). A racial and urbanist overtone creeps into media discussions of Semenya’s physicality, both her body and her geographical background: “Her home village, Masehlong, is an isolated outpost in the bush, surrounded by miles of dry and dusty scrubland”, wrote David Smith in The Observer (Smith 2009). However, I suspect that this juxtaposing of supposed “African” and “Western” perspectives arises largely because of a lack of awareness of the existence and treatment of unusual sex-gender configurations even in the industrialized and urban West: far from being unheard-of occurrences limited to remote rural areas, physical intersex conditions affect as many people in Britain and North America as Down’s syndrome. Indeed, approximately 1 in 2,500 people is born with a physical intersex condition (also sometimes called DSD or disorder of sex development) – a congenital condition where there is a disjunction between chromosomes and genital appearance, or the physical sex is otherwise atypical. It is still commonplace in some quarters to “correct” ambiguous-looking genitalia in childhood, to make the child look like a “normal” boy or (usually) girl; but this has been criticized by intersex activists since the 1990s because it compromises genital sensation and reinscribes highly heterosexual norms (for example, it is considered crucial that a girl has a vaginal opening capable of being penetrated by a penis, even if surgery eradicates her own capacity for sexual pleasure; if a boy’s penis is considered too small to be able to penetrate a vagina successfully, the penis may be removed altogether). Western observers of the Semenya case should not assume that their own societies have solved the problem of what to do for the best when someone is found to have a body which does not easily fit the male-female binary.   
 The irony of Western caricaturing of “African” ignorance was, indeed, picked up by Leonard Chuene, the former president of Athletics South Africa who stepped down after admitting that he had deliberately covered up the fact that Semenya had undergone gynaecological testing.​[4]​ Chuene was quoted as saying that the IAAF’s and Western media’s speculation about Semenya was racist:  

“Who are white people to question the makeup of an African girl? I say this is racism, pure and simple. In Africa, as in any other country, parents look at new babies and can see straight away whether to raise them as a boy or a girl. We are now being told that it is not so simple. But the people who question these things have no idea how much shame such a slur can bring on a family. They are doubting the parents of this child and questioning the way they brought her up. God has his say on what people are. He made us all ... It is outrageous for people from other countries to tell us ‘We want to take her to a laboratory because we don’t like her nose, or her figure.’” (Chuene, quoted in Smith 2009)

This is a complex statement, containing many layers of assumption and rhetoric: the assumption that “white people” and “African people” are necessarily two discrete groups; the assumption that it is always clear whether babies should be reared as boys or girls, in Africa and elsewhere (which ongoing protocols for the treatment of intersex conditions demonstrate is not the case); the assumption that parents know best what the gender of their child should be; the assumption that suggesting a child has an unusual sex-gender configuration is necessarily a “slur”; and, interestingly, an implicit assumption that overt or covert comment on physical secondary gender features (such as large noses or muscular “boyish” figures) are of the same kind as comment on unusual genitalia.  
It is difficult to unpack some of these assumptions without reinscribing superior, imperialist attitudes on top of this particular South African narrative – and without repeating the idea that an African could not be expected to know any better. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in South Africa as elsewhere, attitudes to children born with unusual genitalia, or who are later diagnosed with intersex conditions,​[5]​ vary wildly. A documentary on intersex made for SABC2 in South Africa in 2003 shows a range of approaches, from urologist Christie Steinmann who suggests that it is usually best to “make it [the intersexed child] a girl if you can, because you don’t know if you are going to have good enough penile growth after puberty to have… [a] good enough penis to have sexual intercourse”, to doctors based at major teaching hospitals who are following the newer protocol that delayed or even no corrective surgery is best (in van Huyssteen 2003). Importantly, however, what sounds like a deeply defensive attitude from Chuene (“In Africa, as in any other country…”) needs to be contextualized within a grid of narratives surrounding homosexuality, heterosexuality, and the ongoing outworkings of relationships between countries of the Global North and Global South (of which South Africa stands in an almost uniquely liminal position) after colonialism. It is, perhaps, not too much of a stretch to say that the suspicion of pronouncements by Western “experts” is at least coloured by the imperial history of the treatment of Sara/Saartjie Baartman and others, and a desire by individuals and communities in Africa to be recognized as legitimate actor-agents with the capability to manage their own affairs rather than giving over power and control to outside discourses and “authorities”. 
	This desire is, however, still a deeply ambiguous one, especially when “African” discourses and goods appear to clash with “Western” ones. The particular complexities and uncertainties underlying Leonard Chuene’s assertions are deeply relevant when considering theology’s capacity or otherwise to analyze and comment upon bodies deemed unusual or atypical. I want to suggest that postcolonial theological themes and methodologies are particularly useful for considering ethical issues surrounding indeterminate sex and gender, since they are willing to sit with uncertainty and are committed to uncovering historically undervalued narratives. Importantly, this is of relevance not just to questions which seem explicitly to turn on “race”, but also to those surrounding indeterminate gender. If Sara/Saartjie Baartman and Caster Semenya’s stories have striking similarities, as Ray hints, they also have important differences: whilst Baartman’s supposed body was deemed to represent a primitive and perhaps excessive kind of specifically female sexuality (Sharpley-Whiting 1999: 26) – with implications that she might be more animal than human, but with no doubt about whether or not she was “really” female – Semenya’s body, as with those of Genoveva Anonma, Salimata Simpore​[6]​ and others, has been figured as deliberately or accidentally misleading in its not-really-femaleness. As Chuene hints, many of the stirrings from observers of Semenya in Berlin and elsewhere were about not her actual or supposed genital appearance, but about her secondary characteristics. Her tall, muscular frame, broad shoulders, lack of obvious breasts or hips, square jaw, heavy brow, and even her short hair were all taken as evidence that she was not really female and should not be allowed to compete against women. Not insignificantly, the BBC reported that shortly after the controversy in Berlin, Semenya was given a makeover by You magazine in South Africa. The image from her covershoot (You 144, 10 September 2009, viewable online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8243553.stm) shows Semenya with loose wavy hair, shaped eyebrows, subtle make-up, nail polish, gold jewellery and a drapey black dress – in other words, accoutrements of a “real” woman. The implication of such a makeover, deliberate or not, seems to be that Semenya brought speculation about her genitals on herself by refusing to conform to the standards expected of real women, but now that she has done her bit, she should be forgiven. (It may or may not be significant that, since 2009, Semenya has been observed with longer hair and training in pink-coloured clothing – Penny 2010.) In short, however, while Baartman was held up as an example of the sexual differences between white and black women – who were, nonetheless, all women –  and whose “animal” anatomy confirmed rather than challenged what scientists of the time expected to find, the narratives surrounding Semenya point to a concern with the differences between normality and abnormality. Semenya’s supposed body (which, like Baartman’s in her lifetime, has remained partially unseen) challenges all existing categories, rather than falling neatly into one which is considered legitimate even in its othering (as Baartman’s body reinscribed beliefs about the “Hottentot” body).	
In the course of my work on intersex and theology I have aimed to show that human sex and gender are more complex than theological narratives have often allowed. However, it is also important to note that inter-cultural theological reflection on unusual physicality is always already complicated by a legacy of theological imperialism. Indeed, I suggest that historical figurings of female bodies as there to be colonized, conquered and tamed (Kwok 2005: 16; Dube 2006: 149; Copeland 2002) chime with theological colonizations of all indeterminately sexed and gendered bodies. Thomas Bohache has suggested that “heterocolonialism” oppresses LGBT and queer people in the contemporary USA, calling it a “manifestation of empire, the symptoms of which include both an insistence upon rigid sexual and gender norms and the imposition of silence on those who deviate from these norms” (Bohache 2007: 7-8); I suggest that gender colonialism exists as an exclusion of intersex. But, further, what I seek to do in the remainder of this chapter is to argue that postcolonial theologies might help to disrupt naïve certainties surrounding both bodies and their sexes, and the ways in Western and non-Western cultures and societies can speak to and with one another theologically and socially – thereby pointing to a theology of hybridity which is less clear and exclusive.
	As a theologian concerned with issues of gender and sexuality in particular, I have found the ongoing debates about homosexuality and authority within the Anglican Communion to provide a case in point. Kwok Pui-lan and others have argued that many of the ongoing tensions surrounding sex and race in the Christian Churches are directly informed by Britain’s colonial past. For example, argues Kwok, the tension surrounding homosexuality within the Anglican Communion is still influenced by nineteenth-century missionary attitudes to African and other indigenous cultures. The sexual mores of the African churches (and of some Christians of African and Caribbean descent now living in Britain) may well now be too conservative for much liberal British and North American taste, but they are directly related to the Victorian British norms imposed on Africa by missionaries (Kwok 2001: 64). Kwok figures this as an internalization of historic Western norms on the parts of some Global South clergy (which Homi K. Bhabha might have termed “colonial mimicry”, a conscious or unconscious strategy of annexing colonists’ power by taking on board their discourses and beliefs). In some cases, these attitudes have been assimilated to such an extent that many black African Christians claim that homosexuality is a white Western phenomenon, something “not African” – though the growing visibility of African-based LGBT groups since 2000 means that this argument is beginning to lose its force. However, the Church of England must now deal with the fact that resisting imperialism means giving up authority over non-Western sister communions in the area of sexual morality (see Douglas and Kwok 2001). Douglas comments, 

“Lambeth 1998 signaled a turning point for Anglicanism. In debates over international debt and/or sexuality, it became abundantly clear to all that the churches in the southern hemisphere or the Two-Thirds World would not stand idly by while their sisters and brothers in the United States, England, and other Western countries continued to set the agenda. Whether aided or not by some in the West who stood to gain ground in sexuality debates by siding with bishops in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific, Lambeth 1998 pointed out that a profound power shift has occurred within Anglicanism ... Old understandings of Anglican identity based on shared Anglo-American hegemony have broken down.” (Douglas 2001: 25-6)

African bishops are making it clear that they will not capitulate to the Church of England or to the Episcopal Church of the USA, and that to resist Western hegemonic modes of discourse means, as far as they are concerned, resisting liberal attitudes to homosexuality where these are understood as unilateral impositions by the Western churches. The Nigerian Archbishop Peter Akinola said in 2004, in response to the publication of the Windsor Report,​[7]​

“A small, economically privileged group of people has sought to subvert the Christian faith and impose their new and false doctrine on the wider community of faithful believers … Why, throughout the document, is there such a marked contrast between the language used against those who are subverting the faith and that used against those of us, from the Global South, who are trying to bring the church back to the Bible? … Where are the words of ‘deep regret’ for the impact of [the Episcopal Church of the USA]’s actions upon the Global South and our missionary efforts? Where is the language of rebuke for those who are promoting sexual sins as holy and acceptable behaviour? The imbalance is bewildering.” (Akinola 2004)

Benjamin Kwashi, the Archbishop of Jos in Nigeria, said in a 2008 BBC documentary about the run-up to the GAFCON (Global Anglican Future) conference, “From the mother Church of England, there is the assumption that … we can do anything and Africans will automatically come with us, or respect us. I think that is an insult” (Kwashi speaking in Read 2008). Kwashi said that the Western churches ignored the issues really pressing to African Christians, such as AIDS and infant mortality, and did not take their concerns seriously.
	Kwok Pui-lan and the Nigerian archbishops start from very different political, social and theological assumptions, not least in terms of the ways in which they respectively affirm and deny LGBT-identified people. It is also important to note that examples from the Nigerian context cannot and should not be unproblematically read into the whole African debate in any universalizing way – discourses arising from one African country and context are likely to be strikingly different from those arising in others.​[8]​ Nonetheless, the fact that Akinola and Kwashi can loudly and vehemently cite the same kinds of injuries that postcolonial theologians and biblical scholars like Kwok, R.S. Sugirtharajah, Fernando F. Segovia, Joerg Rieger, Mayra Rivera and others have so strikingly exposed over the past decades shows that the interactions between sex, colonialism and global economics are still far-reaching and devastating (and that Western theologians should bear in mind that they are also likely to colour debates such as that surrounding Caster Semenya). Moreover, the fact that Akinola and Kwashi themselves somehow purport to speak on behalf of “Africans” and the “Global South” suggests that there is merit in asking broad questions about the extent to which some of those speaking theologically from outside the West are themselves setting up a Western versus non-Western dichotomy in which diversities of approach are elided. 
Indeed, crucially, as I now want to explore in more detail, the problematic legacy of colonialism and of Western Orientalist scholarship emphatically does not mean that Christians in the West should not speak to and with African Christians about issues of sexuality, any more than it means those researching intersex and related conditions in the West should not speak to and with doctors, parents and intersex activism groups in Africa and elsewhere. However, it does necessitate a real awareness that Western “expertise” will now always be treated with suspicion when it seems to repeat hierarchical, colonial attitudes toward non-Western cultures. Dealing with this tension sensitively, without caricaturing African cultures as somehow innocent, childlike and incontrovertible, is extremely important in terms of both negotiating specifically ecclesiological sex-gender concerns (as within the Anglican Communion’s debates on homosexuality), and considering if and how theology might critique broader ethical and cultural norms surrounding sex, gender and sexuality (as with norms for the treatment of intersex conditions).
If postcolonial theologies are, indeed, to provide a useful methodological thinking tool for thinking through ethical responses to issues of unusual embodiment and (especially) unusual bodily sex, I suggest that they are likely to do so in one of two ways.
First, we might look to the trope of hybridity. Hybridity in postcolonial thought is most often grounded in the concept as developed by Homi K. Bhabha (1994) who argues that colonizer and colonized cannot be unproblematically polarized. In fact, both colonizer and colonized are changed in their encounter, within a liminal or third space between their positionalities. Hybridization, for Bhabha, involves negotiation, both in the sense of parleying and bargaining among those from differing conceptual sites (one of whom may be ostensibly more powerful than the other), and in the sense of discursivity which takes place between two places and has to navigate these uncharted waters. He says,

“Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power. For the colonial hybrid is the articulation of the ambivalent space where the rite of power is enacted on the site of desire, making its objects at once disciplinary and disseminatory.” (Bhabha 1994: 112)

In other words, hybridity means that neither the colonist who has annexed another culture, nor the colonized person who might have annexed some of the colonist’s power via mimicry,​[9]​ can be unproblematically dismissed as oppressive. Mimicry both repeats a particular trope of power and exposes it as artifice (much like the phenomenon of camp). In the very repetition of patterns of power, therefore, power is exposed and can be judged. Colonizers do not remain untouched by the indigenous cultures around them any more than those colonized do by the imperial incomers. The new reality emerges neither on the colonizers’ nor the colonized persons’ turf, but somewhere which exceeds both and queries their representations as binary. Rather than the colonized person being constituted only in opposition to the colonizer, as a pale imitation who can never live up to the colonial ideal, both the colonizer and colonized are shown mutually to constitute each other. 
Of course, this idea, and the consequent hazy or “fuzzy” identity which arises, is not an unprobematically positive one, as some postcolonial theologians and biblical scholars have noted: the colonized person might still be deemed to have had to compromise their existing identity against their will. Richard A. Horsley notes that, in some accounts, postcolonial hybridity “fails to distinguish the different ways in which colonial power affected peoples in different contexts according to various factors such as class, gender and race” (Horsley 2003: 306). Citing Aijaz Ahmad, Horsley says, “Hybridity appears as a postmodernist ‘carnivalesque collapse and play of identities,’ possible mainly for ‘the migrant intellectual’ who ‘thus disperses with a sense of place, of belonging, of some stable commitment to one’s class or gender or nation’” (Horsley 2003: 306; cf. Ahmad 1995: 13-14). Moreover, notes Laura E. Donaldson, the advocating of “mixedness” as a good in the postcolonial context often benefits colonizers more than those colonized, with the colonized peoples eventually becoming lost in the mainstream into which they have become subsumed (biologically, culturally or otherwise). Mixedness and hybridity therefore risk assimilationism, with the conquered genealogies, stories and treasures becoming lost (Donaldson 2006: 164).
Nonetheless, the recognition and interrogation of hybridity also has built into it an awareness of colonial authority and the powers of naming and representation (Kwok 2005: 170). It thereby has the potential to continue to query and resist the either-or characterization of races and cultures that sometimes underlies both imperialist colonization and its rejection. Since it always remains aware of the inequities of power and culture coming to the table, postcolonial hybridity in fact allows for a more sophisticated rejection of both binary difference and its unproblematized opposite, amorphous assimilationism. Western theologians might find this valuable when they seek to appeal to broad concepts such as justice as “goods”, whilst being aware that these have been disrupted by their legacy of association with both slave-based capitalism, and phenomena such as human rights which are sometimes rejected as being inherently and exclusively Western. R.S. Sugirtharajah, the postcolonial biblical critic, suggests that the colonial mindset was all about portraying the colonizer, imperialist and metropole as right, and the colonized culture or native person as wrong. By contrast, postcolonial hybridity suggests that there are multiple truths, that one is not unproblematically better than the other, even as it critiques entrenched patterns of injustice in past and neo-colonialism (Sugirtharajah 2003: 124). Ian Douglas argues that it is white, male heterosexual clerics who are most likely to be disturbed by challenges to Western hegemony in the Anglican Communion, since it is they who are unused to an already-hybridized identity (Douglas 2001: 31); I suggest that, when an unusual sex-gender identity or bodily configuration arises, it is all those whose own bodies have formerly been considered unremarkable or unquestionable who are most at risk, and that it is for this reason that broader theological re-examinations of hybridity as a good (as through the work of postcolonial theologians like Kwok, Bohache and Patrick S. Cheng) will be of benefit. 
	Second, and importantly when we come to think about gender and sexuality, postcolonial theologies help to refigure the past and present not just for former colonies but also for their former metropolises (since both colonizer and colonized must consider what it means to exist “after colonialism”, that is in a world which has colonialism as part of its history and neocolonialism as part of its present continuous). This means and requires a constant re-examination of which discourses are the “colonial” ones. As Foucault knew, power is deeply ambivalent, and can be wielded violently just as much by those who are oppressed as by their oppressors. Discourses of empire, which postcolonial theologies should challenge, might therefore not be those (or not exclusively those) which have arisen in Western contexts, but also those which are rooted in non-Western contexts but which formulate and disseminate speech of another empire, that of narrow conformity to particular sexed norms. It is in this context that it is appropriate for theologians working in the former metropoles to speak into and to critique non-Western discourses, not untouched by our own colonial past and present, but also not immobilized by it. Ceding control over non-Western theological discourses is appropriate, but so is respecting non-Western theological conversation partners as intelligent and reasonable interlocutors who deserve to hear us say how and why – for example – homophobic and anti-female narratives might fall short. As Joerg Rieger notes, “External colonialisms often correspond to internal ones” (Rieger 2004: 213) – so it is not unproblematically the case that anti-homosexual convictions are “more authentically African”, or that every disruption of unproblematized narratives of sex and gender stems from Western imperial motives. In some cases, the “metropolitan history” which is still over-represented (Kwok 2001: 58) is not just (or not unproblematically) that geographically located in the former metropoles, but also that of the people given power, legitimacy, and authority to speak. To reject colonial frameworks of power does not mean to idealize or render immaculate those in non-Western contexts with whom we seek to engage. Nonetheless, this is proving a difficult path to negotiate: commenting on debates over homosexuality between bishops of the Global South and Global North at the 1998 Lambeth Conference, Kwok says, “The bishops from the South took the opportunity to ‘talk back’ to the West, assuming that truth was on their side. Some of the liberal bishops in the United States did not challenge these bishops with darker skin, for fear of being accused of racial bigotry” (Kwok 2001: 64). The question remains:

“How can we avoid reinscribing the cultural superiority of the West on the one hand and uncritical acceptance of cultural authenticity of formerly colonized peoples on the other? How can we promote genuine dialogue and mutual understanding that both learn from and go beyond the colonial past, which for some is less than a generation away?” (Kwok 2001: 65)

I suggest that the key will be “speaking with” rather than “speaking to” in our theologies and theological ethics – though always with the proviso that it is appropriate for our theologies to draw on, be shaped by and critique the debates and discourses present within the social, cultural, medical, political and other developments within our own society. 
In an interview with South Africa’s You magazine in 2009, musing on speculation that Semenya would be found to have a biological intersex condition, Caster Semenya’s mother, Dorcus, said, “What is this intersex? … There’s no such thing as an in between. Your child is either a boy or a girl” (http://www.you.co.za/articles/Local/Caster-Semenyas-mom-speaks-out). Semenya’s coach, Michael Seme, when asked by the BBC’s Newsnight programme whether she had undergone any treatment for variant gender, said, “I never come across that one … I don’t think there is something like that here in South Africa … They can think what they think, but … there’s nothing like that” (Seme in BBC 2011). Dorcus Semenya is not the only mother who has been adamant that medical tests cannot change the truth of what she knows her child to be. Caster Semenya’s medical details have not been made public; she has, however, been cleared by the IAAF to compete in women’s races. Whether or not she does have a biological intersex condition is unknown; what is certain is that her body and its possible peculiarities have been made a site of public speculation much as Sara/Saartjie Baartman’s were. But to query and resist colonial and paternalistic attitudes to the sex-gender norms of non-Western cultures, and to defend the rights of those whose bodies have been metaphorically “colonized” by others to self-define, also means continuing to interrogate norms which appear violent, exploitative or otherwise unjust. To critique the disappearing and stigmatization of atypically-sexed bodies does not necessarily mean wielding colonial privilege over poor Africans who do not know any better (which, in itself, reinscribes an Orientalist narrative of non-Western and non-industrial cultures as unchanging and immaculate): rather, it requires a dismantling of nexuses of privilege and power which surround the very core of human identity. 
In an interview with Caster Semenya for BBC Newsnight in January 2011, the interviewer Jackie Long remarked of Semenya’s unwillingness to state publicly the nature of her condition, “That is part of the difficulty, isn’t it, that the rumours fly, and ... nothing has put them to bed, if you like. And … would it be better if you were able to say ‘This is what is happened, this is true’?”; Semenya replied, “Better for me or for you? From my side it’s good.” In 2002, the skeleton and other remains of Sara/Saartje Baartman, which had been held in the Musée de l’Homme in Paris even after they were removed from display in the 1970s, were returned to South Africa after years of petitioning by Nelson Mandela and other campaigners. It was suggested that Baartman’s “return” to her country of birth was a reclaiming of her history from the hands of those Europeans who had appropriated it. Is an action of this kind merely tokenistic, a futile gesture? Not necessarily: an apology represents a commitment not to change the past, which cannot happen, but to endorse a different kind of future. We cannot change the reality of colonialism, but we can change the dynamics through which we conduct dialogue now and in the future. The symbolic return of Sara Baartman to her culture of birth is a way of giving over European rights to univocally define the significance of her body and life-story. 
 Importantly, however, respecting the rights of these women to self-define also represents an endorsement of South Africa (like any other non-Western nation) as a location for complex narratives and engagements – which means that as Western scholars and theologians we should also not consider it too immaculate or too innocent to be critiqued and to be engaged with as a partner in dialogue. Just as it is appropriate to critique and problematize early corrective surgery for intersexed children in non-Western contexts if we would critique and problematize it in Western ones, so it is appropriate to critique and problematize sex-gender narratives in Africa and elsewhere which are grounded in the erasure and exclusion of atypical bodies and marginal sexualities.  
Postcolonial hybridity, and postcolonial theologies’ capacity to retell and reshape stories, are always compromised and ambivalent. Just as, because the New Testament texts were written from within the Roman Empire, it is part of them even as they may try to resist it (Moore 2006: 123), so empire is part of Western theologians’ history even if we would prefer it not to be so. The sexed “empire”, however, also persists both in and beyond the West, and requires a theological response which appeals to postcolonial-type rejections of finality and certainty. Thomas Bohache says of LGBT communities in the USA, 

“By turning against each other, these communities have engaged in the sort of horizontal violence that sometimes results from an internalization of the oppressors’ script; misunderstanding and lack of solidarity between gay men and lesbians, as well as the sex wars and sex panic within these communities, exemplify an internalized heterocolonialism—the acceptance of the system of heterocolonialism as normative for those who wish to live in our society. Rather than questioning the norms and categories of gender and sexuality themselves, women and men, conservatives and liberals alike, have instead turned on each other and leveled the accusations that those who break the rules must be immoral, while those who seek to remain within them must have assimilated.”  (Bohache 2007: 52-3)
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^1	  A version of this paper was presented at the Gender, Feminism and Theology seminar at the 2011 conference of the Society for the Study of Theology in York. I am grateful to Rachel Muers, who chaired the session, and to everyone who contributed comments and questions on that occasion. 
^2	  Given that cultural critics normally understand sex as a biological category and gender as a cultural one (which may or may not supervene on sex), this terminology is odd, and suggests a limited understanding of the complex interactions between sex, gender and sexuality. 
^3	  In some cases, athletes have been found to have conditions which fall under the intersex “umbrella”. In the mid-1980s, the Spanish athlete Maria Patino was discovered during routine chromosomal tests to have XY chromosomes, and subsequently diagnosed with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome. Patino was accused of being a man masquerading as a woman, and was banned from athletic competition for two years before the IAAF reinstated her. Perhaps one of the most well-known athletes to have been found to have an unusual physical sex was Stella Walsh, who had won Olympic gold for the women’s 100m race for Poland in 1932. When, in 1980, Walsh was accidentally killed in the USA, it was discovered she had male genitalia and both XX and XY chromosomes. At the time of the Semenya case, the IAAF was using guidelines prepared in 2006, which explicitly stated that some intersex conditions, including Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, Turner’s Syndrome, and Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, should not prevent athletes competing as women, even if the conditions meant they had levels of testosterone higher than the usual female range (http://www.iaaf.org/mm/document/imported/36983.pdf). 
^4	  Semenya herself was not initially told the reasons for the tests, but was told she was to undergo a standard doping test (Ginnane 2011).
^5	  Intersex conditions are those where there is some physical atypicality surrounding the individual’s sex. This might be externally visible, as when the external genitalia appear unusual or “ambiguous”. Alternatively, there may be an atypicality which is not externally visible and can only be diagnosed via tests – for example, “female” external genitalia coupled with testes rather than ovaries internally, or unusual chromosomal configurations such as XX/XY. Intersex conditions where there is a genital ambiguity are believed to affect around 1 in 2,500 people; overall figures are disputed. Importantly, Caster Semenya has not been publicly stated as having an intersex condition. 
^6	  These members of the Equatorial Guinea women’s soccer team were accused of being male during the African Women’s Football Championship in South Africa in November 2010 (Smith 2010). 
^7	  The Windsor Report was a 2004 report made by the Lambeth Commission on Communion on the state of the unity of the Anglican Communion in light of the consecration of Bishop Gene Robinson and the blessing of same-sex marriages in Canada. It can be read online at http://www.anglicancommunion.org/windsor2004/index.cfm. 
^8	  I am grateful to Ralph Norman for a conversation in which he helped me to clarify my thinking on this point.
^9	  Importantly, although Bhabha is influenced by Rene Girard’s work, colonial mimicry is not identical with mimesis, not least because mimicry is more likely to be conscious and public. Mimicry in Bhabha’s work is also not “solved” by the nomination of a scapegoat onto whom both mimic and mimicked can project their frustrations and thereby defer addressing the root of their original conflict. As Ken Derry usefully summarizes: “One of the limitations of Girard’s theory is that it does not account for situations in which the model, not the imitator, begins the mimetic process.  As … Bhabha has pointed out, this is precisely what happens in colonisation: the invaders set out to remake the native inhabitants into images of themselves. A key difference between this dynamic and the one described by Girard … is that the colonisers only ever desire partial imitation, which Bhabha refers to as mimicry, not mimesis. He defines colonial mimicry then as ‘the desire for a reformed, recognisable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite’ … Like Girard, Bhabha points to the issue of identity in underlying much of this relationship. The element of difference that is fundamental to mimicry, though, means that colonial desire is for a valuation based on what the Other is not; that is, ‘mimicry rearticulates presence in terms of its “otherness”, that which it disavows’” (Derry 2002: 205-6). This means that the colonized person may find it difficult to value their selfhood, since this is devalued and disavowed by the colonizer. This, of course, puts the colonized person in a Catch-22 situation: the colonized person never can become a “full” copy of the colonizer, but their original identity is also devalued. They are not good enough as themselves; they are also not good enough as imitations of the colonizer. 
